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笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第章

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my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise
that it is not in me either formally or eminently; and that
consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it; it follows of
necessity that I am not alone in the world; but that there is
another being which exists; or which is the cause of this
idea。  On the other hand; had no such an idea existed in me; I
should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the
existence of any being beyond myself; for I have made very
careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time
have been able to find no other ground。
     But of my ideas; beyond that which represents me to
myself; as to which there can here be no difficulty; there is
another which represents a God; and there are others
representing corporeal and inanimate things; others angels;
others animals; and others again which represent to me men
similar to myself。
     As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or
animals; or angels; I can however easily conceive that they
might be formed by an admixture of the other ideas which I
have of myself; of corporeal things; and of God; even although
there were apart from me neither men nor animals; nor angels;
in all the world。
     And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects; I do not
recognise in them anything so great or so excellent that they
might not have possibly proceeded from myself; for if I
consider them more closely; and examine them individually; as
I yesterday examined the idea of wax; I find that there is
very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly。
Magnitude or extension in length; breadth; or depth; I do so
perceive; also figure which results from a termination of this
extension; the situation which bodies of different figure
preserve in relation to one another; and movement or change of
situation; to which we may also add substance; duration and
number。  As to other things such as light; colours; sounds;
scents; tastes; heat; cold and the other tactile qualities;
they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion
that I do not even know if they are true or false; i。e。
whether the ideas which I form of these qualities are actually
the ideas of real objects or not 'or whether they only
represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact'。  For although
I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that
falsity; properly speaking; or formal falsity; can be met
with; a certain material falsity may nevertheless be found in
ideas; i。e。 when these ideas represent what is nothing as
though it were something。  For example; the ideas which I have
of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct that by
their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation
of heat; or heat a privation of cold; or whether both are real
qualities; or are not such。  And inasmuch as 'since ideas
resemble images' there cannot be any ideas which do not appear
to represent some things; if it is correct to say that cold is
merely a privation of heat; the idea which represents it to me
as something real and positive will not be improperly termed
false; and the same holds good of other similar ideas。
     To these it is certainly not necessary that I should
attribute any author other than myself。  For if they are
false; i。e。 if they represent things which do not exist; the
light of nature shows me that they issue from nought; that is
to say; that they are only in me so far as something is
lacking to the perfection of my nature。  But if they are true;
nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that
I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from
non…being; I do not see any reason why they should not be
produced by myself。
     As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of
corporeal things; some of them seem as though I might have
derived them from the idea which I possess of myself; as those
which I have of substance; duration; number; and such like。
For 'even' when I think that a stone is a substance; or at
least a thing capable of existing of itself; and that I am a
substance also; although I conceive that I am a thing that
thinks and not one that is extended; and that the stone on the
other hand is an extended thing which does not think; and that
thus there is a notable difference between the two
conceptions¥they seem; nevertheless; to agree in this; that
both represent substances。  In the same way; when I perceive
that I now exist and further recollect that I have in former
times existed; and when I remember that I have various
thoughts of which I can recognise the number; I acquire ideas
of duration and number which I can afterwards transfer to any
object that I please。  But as to all the other qualities of
which the ideas of corporeal things are posed; to wit;
extension; figure; situation and motion; it is true that they
are not formally in me; since I am only a thing that thinks;
but because they are merely certain modes of substance 'and so
to speak the vestments under which corporeal substance appears
to us' and because I myself am also a substance; it would seem
that they might be contained in me eminently。
     Hence there remains only the idea of God; concerning
which we must consider whether it is something which cannot
have proceeded from me myself。  By the name God I understand a
substance that is infinite 'eternal; immutable'; independent;
all…knowing; all…powerful; and by which I myself and
everything else; if anything else does exist; have been
created。  Now all these characteristics are such that the more
diligently I attend to them; the less do they appear capable
of proceeding from me alone; hence; from what has been already
said; we must conclude that God necessarily exists。
     For although the idea of substance is within me owing to
the fact that I am substance; nevertheless I should not have
the idea of an infinite substance¥since I am finite¥if it had
not proceeded from some substance which was veritably
infinite。
     Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite
by a true idea; but only by the negation of the finite; just
as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement
and of light; for; on the contrary; I see that there is
manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite;
and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the
infinite earlier then the finite¥to wit; the notion of God
before that of myself。  For how would it be possible that I
should know that I doubt and desire; that is to say; that
something is lacking to me; and that I am not quite perfect;
unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than
myself; in parison with which I should recognise the
deficiencies of my nature?
     And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps
materially false and that consequently I can derive it from
nought 'i。e。 that possibly it exists in me because I am
imperfect'; as I have just said is the case with ideas of
heat; cold and other such things; for; on the contrary; as
this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it
more objective reality than any other; there can be none which
is of its
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