按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise
that it is not in me either formally or eminently； and that
consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it； it follows of
necessity that I am not alone in the world； but that there is
another being which exists； or which is the cause of this
idea。 On the other hand； had no such an idea existed in me； I
should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the
existence of any being beyond myself； for I have made very
careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time
have been able to find no other ground。
But of my ideas； beyond that which represents me to
myself； as to which there can here be no difficulty； there is
another which represents a God； and there are others
representing corporeal and inanimate things； others angels；
others animals； and others again which represent to me men
similar to myself。
As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or
animals； or angels； I can however easily conceive that they
might be formed by an admixture of the other ideas which I
have of myself； of corporeal things； and of God； even although
there were apart from me neither men nor animals； nor angels；
in all the world。
And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects； I do not
recognise in them anything so great or so excellent that they
might not have possibly proceeded from myself； for if I
consider them more closely； and examine them individually； as
I yesterday examined the idea of wax； I find that there is
very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly。
Magnitude or extension in length； breadth； or depth； I do so
perceive； also figure which results from a termination of this
extension； the situation which bodies of different figure
preserve in relation to one another； and movement or change of
situation； to which we may also add substance； duration and
number。 As to other things such as light； colours； sounds；
scents； tastes； heat； cold and the other tactile qualities；
they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion
that I do not even know if they are true or false； i。e。
whether the ideas which I form of these qualities are actually
the ideas of real objects or not ＇or whether they only
represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact＇。 For although
I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that
falsity； properly speaking； or formal falsity； can be met
with； a certain material falsity may nevertheless be found in
ideas； i。e。 when these ideas represent what is nothing as
though it were something。 For example； the ideas which I have
of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct that by
their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation
of heat； or heat a privation of cold； or whether both are real
qualities； or are not such。 And inasmuch as ＇since ideas
resemble images＇ there cannot be any ideas which do not appear
to represent some things； if it is correct to say that cold is
merely a privation of heat； the idea which represents it to me
as something real and positive will not be improperly termed
false； and the same holds good of other similar ideas。
To these it is certainly not necessary that I should
attribute any author other than myself。 For if they are
false； i。e。 if they represent things which do not exist； the
light of nature shows me that they issue from nought； that is
to say； that they are only in me so far as something is
lacking to the perfection of my nature。 But if they are true；
nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that
I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from
non…being； I do not see any reason why they should not be
produced by myself。
As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of
corporeal things； some of them seem as though I might have
derived them from the idea which I possess of myself； as those
which I have of substance； duration； number； and such like。
For ＇even＇ when I think that a stone is a substance； or at
least a thing capable of existing of itself； and that I am a
substance also； although I conceive that I am a thing that
thinks and not one that is extended； and that the stone on the
other hand is an extended thing which does not think； and that
thus there is a notable difference between the two
conceptions￥they seem； nevertheless； to agree in this； that
both represent substances。 In the same way； when I perceive
that I now exist and further recollect that I have in former
times existed； and when I remember that I have various
thoughts of which I can recognise the number； I acquire ideas
of duration and number which I can afterwards transfer to any
object that I please。 But as to all the other qualities of
which the ideas of corporeal things are posed； to wit；
extension； figure； situation and motion； it is true that they
are not formally in me； since I am only a thing that thinks；
but because they are merely certain modes of substance ＇and so
to speak the vestments under which corporeal substance appears
to us＇ and because I myself am also a substance； it would seem
that they might be contained in me eminently。
Hence there remains only the idea of God； concerning
which we must consider whether it is something which cannot
have proceeded from me myself。 By the name God I understand a
substance that is infinite ＇eternal； immutable＇； independent；
all…knowing； all…powerful； and by which I myself and
everything else； if anything else does exist； have been
created。 Now all these characteristics are such that the more
diligently I attend to them； the less do they appear capable
of proceeding from me alone； hence； from what has been already
said； we must conclude that God necessarily exists。
For although the idea of substance is within me owing to
the fact that I am substance； nevertheless I should not have
the idea of an infinite substance￥since I am finite￥if it had
not proceeded from some substance which was veritably
infinite。
Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite
by a true idea； but only by the negation of the finite； just
as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement
and of light； for； on the contrary； I see that there is
manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite；
and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the
infinite earlier then the finite￥to wit； the notion of God
before that of myself。 For how would it be possible that I
should know that I doubt and desire； that is to say； that
something is lacking to me； and that I am not quite perfect；
unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than
myself； in parison with which I should recognise the
deficiencies of my nature？
And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps
materially false and that consequently I can derive it from
nought ＇i。e。 that possibly it exists in me because I am
imperfect＇； as I have just said is the case with ideas of
heat； cold and other such things； for； on the contrary； as
this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it
more objective reality than any other； there can be none which
is of its