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attached to some corporeal or extended substance； and not to
an intelligent substance； since in the clear and distinct
conception of these there is some sort of extension found to
be present； but no intellection at all。 There is certainly
further in me a certain passive faculty of perception； that
is； of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things；
but this would be useless to me ＇and I could in no way avail
myself of it＇； if there were not either in me or in some other
thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing
these ideas。 But this active faculty cannot exist in me
＇inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks＇ seeing that it does not
presuppose thought； and also that those ideas are often
produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same；
and often even against my will； it is thus necessarily the
case that the faculty resides in some substance different from
me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas
that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently
contained； as I remarked before。 And this substance is either
a body； that is； a corporeal nature in which there is
contained formally ＇and really＇ all that which is objectively
＇and by representation＇ in those ideas； or it is God Himself；
or some other creature more noble than body in which that same
is contained eminently。 But； since God is no deceiver； it is
very manifest that He does not municate to me these ideas
immediately and by Himself； nor yet by the intervention of
some creature in which their reality is not formally； but only
eminently； contained。 For since He has given me no faculty to
recognise that this is the case； but； on the other hand； a
very great inclination to believe ＇that they are sent to me
or＇ that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects； I do
not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit
if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal
objects。 Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist。
However； they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the
senses； since this prehension by the senses is in many
instances very obscure and confused； but we must at least
admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and
distinctly； that is to say； all things which； speaking
generally； are prehended in the object of pure mathematics；
are truly to be recognised as external objects。
As to other things； however； which are either particular
only； as； for example； that the sun is of such and such a
figure； etc。； or which are less clearly and distinctly
conceived； such as light； sound； pain and the like； it is
certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain； yet
on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver； and that
consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my
opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of
correcting； I may assuredly hope to conclude that I have
within me the means of arriving at the truth even here。 And
first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature
teaches me there is some truth contained； for by nature；
considered in general； I now understand no other thing than
either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God
has established in created things； and by my nature in
particular I understand no other thing than the plexus of
all the things which God has given me。
But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more
expressly ＇nor more sensibly＇ than that I have a body which is
adversely affected when I feel pain； which has need of food or
drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst； and
so on； nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this。
Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain；
hunger； thirst； etc。； that I am not only lodged in my body as
a pilot in a vessel； but that I am not only lodged in my body
as a pilot in a vessel； but that I am very closely united to
it； and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to
pose with it one whole。 For if that were not the case；
when my body is hurt； I； who am merely a thinking thing；
should not feel pain； for I should perceive this wound by the
understanding only； just as the sailor perceives by sight when
something is damaged in his vessel； and when my body has need
of drink or food； I should clearly understand the fact without
being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst。
For all these sensations of hunger； thirst； pain； etc。 are in
truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which
are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind
and body。
Moreover； nature teaches me that many other bodies exist
around mine； of which some are to be avoided； and others
sought after。 And certainly from the fact that I am sensible
of different sorts of colours； sounds； scents； tastes； heat；
hardness； etc。； I very easily conclude that there are in the
bodies from which all these diverse sense…perceptions proceed
certain variations which answer to them； although possibly
these are not really at all similar to them。 And also from
the fact that amongst these different sense…perceptions some
are very agreeable to me and others disagreeable； it is quite
certain that my body （or rather myself in my entirety；
inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul） may receive
different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from the
other bodies which surround it。
But there are many other things which nature seems to
have taught me； but which at the same time I have never really
received from her； but which have been brought about in my
mind by a certain habit which I have of forming inconsiderate
judgments on things； and thus it may easily happen that these
judgments contain some error。 Take； for example； the opinion
which I hold that all space in which there is nothing that
affects ＇or makes an impression on＇ my senses is void； that in
a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to
the idea of heat which is in me； that in a white or green body
there is the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive； that
in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste； and so on
in other instances； that the stars； the towers； and all other
distant bodies are of the same figure and size as they appear
from far off to our eyes； etc。 But in order that in this
there should be nothing which I do not conceive distinctly； I
should define exactly what I really understand when I say that
I am taught somewhat by nature。 For here I take nature in a
more limited signification than when I term it the sum of all
the things given me by God； since in this sum many things are
prehended which only pertain to mind （and to these I do not
refer in speaking of nature） such as the notion which I have
of the fact that what has once been done cannot ever be undone
and an infinitude of such things which I know by the light of
nature ＇without the help of the body＇； and seeing that it
prehends many other matters besides which only pertain to
body； and are no longer here contained under the name of
nature； such as the quality of weight which it possesses and
the like； with which I