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which they think they know best； how do I know that I am not
deceived every time that I add two and three； or count the
sides of a square； or judge of things yet simpler； if anything
simpler can be imagined？ But possibly God has not desired
that I should be thus deceived； for He is said to be supremely
good。 If； however； it is contrary to His goodness to have
made me such that I constantly deceive myself； it would also
appear to be contrary to His goodness to permit me to be
sometimes deceived； and nevertheless I cannot doubt that He
does permit this。
There may indeed be those who would prefer to deny the
existence of a God so powerful； rather than believe that all
other things are uncertain。 But let us not oppose them for
the present； and grant that all that is here said of a God is
a fable； nevertheless in whatever way they suppose that I have
arrived at the state of being that I have reached￥whether they
attribute it to fate or to accident； or make out that it is by
a continual succession of antecedents； or by some other
method￥since to err and deceive oneself is a defect； it is
clear that the greater will be the probability of my being so
imperfect as to deceive myself ever； as is the Author to whom
they assign my origin the less powerful。 To these reasons I
have certainly nothing to reply； but at the end I feel
constrained to confess that there is nothing in all that I
formerly believed to be true； of which I cannot in some
measure doubt； and that not merely through want of thought or
through levity； but for reasons which are very powerful and
maturely considered； so that henceforth I ought not the less
carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions
than to that which is manifestly false； if I desire to arrive
at any certainty ＇in the sciences＇。
But it is not sufficient to have made these remarks； we
must also be careful to keep them in mind。 For these ancient
and monly held opinions still revert frequently to my mind；
long and familiar custom having given them the right to occupy
my mind against my inclination and rendered them almost
masters of my belief； nor will I ever lose the habit of
deferring to them or of placing my confidence in them； so long
as I consider them as they really are； i。e。 opinions in some
measure doubtful； as I have just shown； and at the same time
highly probable； so that there is much more reason to believe
in than to deny them。 That is why I consider that I shall not
be acting amiss； if； taking of set purpose a contrary belief；
I allow myself to be deceived； and for a certain time pretend
that all these opinions are entirely false and imaginary；
until at last； having thus balanced my former prejudices with
my latter ＇so that they cannot divert my opinions more to one
side than to the other＇； my judgment will no longer be
dominated by bad usage or turned away from the right knowledge
of the truth。 For I am assured that there can be neither
peril nor error in this course； and that I cannot at present
yield too much to distrust； since I am not considering the
question of action； but only of knowledge。
I shall then suppose； not that God who is supremely good
and the fountain of truth； but some evil genius not less
powerful than deceitful； has employed his whole energies in
deceiving me； I shall consider that the heavens； the earth；
colours； figures； sound； and all other external things are
nought but the illusions and dreams of which this genius has
availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity； I
shall consider myself as having no hands； no eyes； no flesh；
no blood； nor any senses； yet falsely believing myself to
possess all these things； I shall remain obstinately attached
to this idea； and if by this means it is not in my power to
arrive at the knowledge of any truth； I may at least do what
is in my power ＇i。e。 suspend my judgment＇； and with firm
purpose avoid giving credence to any false thing； or being
imposed upon by this arch deceiver； however powerful and
deceptive he may be。 But this task is a laborious one； and
insensibly a certain lassitude leads me into the course of my
ordinary life。 And just as a captive who in sleep enjoys an
imaginary liberty； when he begins to suspect that his liberty
is but a dream； fears to awaken； and conspires with these
agreeable illusions that the deception may be prolonged； so
insensibly of my own accord I fall back into my former
opinions； and I dread awakening from this slumber； lest the
laborious wakefulness which would follow the tranquillity of
this repose should have to be spent not in daylight； but in
the excessive darkness of the difficulties which have just
been discussed。
Meditation II
Of the Nature of the Human Mind； and that it is more easily
known than the Body。
The Meditation of yesterday filled my mind with so many
doubts that it is no longer in my power to forget them。 And
yet I do not see in what manner I can resolve them； and； just
as if I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water； I am
so disconcerted that I can neither make certain of setting my
feet on the bottom； nor can I swim and so support myself on
the surface。 I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow
anew the same path as that on which I yesterday entered； i。e。
I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least
doubt could be supposed to exist； just as if I had discovered
that it was absolutely false； and I shall ever follow in this
road until I have met with something which is certain； or at
least； if I can do nothing else； until I have learned for
certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain。
Archimedes； in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe
out of its place； and transport it elsewhere； demanded only
that one point should be fixed and immoveable； in the same way
I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy
enough to discover one thing only which is certain and
indubitable。
I suppose； then； that all the things that I see are
false； I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all
that my fallacious memory represents to me。 I consider that I
possess no senses； I imagine that body； figure； extension；
movement and place are but the fictions of my mind。 What；
then； can be esteemed as true？ Perhaps nothing at all； unless
that there is nothing in the world that is certain。
But how can I know there is not something different from
those things that I have just considered； of which one cannot
have the slightest doubt？ Is there not some God； or some
other being by whatever name we call it； who puts these
reflections into my mind？ That is not necessary； for is it
not possible that I am capable of producing them myself？ I
myself； am I not at least something？ But I have already
denied that I had senses and body。 Yet I hesitate； for what
follows from that？ Am I so dependent on body and senses that
I cannot exist without these？ But I was persuaded that there
was nothing in all the world； that there was no heaven； no
earth