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thoroughly contemptible； were quickly wiped out； but I will bring this
discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this
difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far
less degree； because； notwithstanding one has to give them some
indulgence； that is soon done； none of these princes have armies that
are veterans in the governance and administration of provinces； as were
the armies of the Roman Empire； and whereas it was then more necessary
to give satisfaction to the soldiers than to the people； it is now more
necessary to all princes； except the Turk and the Soldan； to satisfy the
people rather than the soldiers； because the people are the more
powerful。
From the above I have excepted the Turk； who always keeps round him
twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the
security and strength of the kingdom； and it is necessary that； putting
aside every consideration for the people； he should keep them his
friends。 The kingdom of the Soldan is similar； being entirely in the
hands of soldiers； follows again that； without regard to the people； he
must keep them his friends。 But you must note that the state of the
Soldan is unlike all other principalities； for the reason that it is
like the Christian pontificate； which cannot be called either an
hereditary or a newly formed principality； because the sons of the old
prince not the heirs； but he who is elected to that position by those
who have authority； and the sons remain only noblemen。 And this being an
ancient custom； it cannot be called a new principality； because there
are none of those difficulties in it that are met with in new ones； for
although the prince is new； the constitution of the state is old； and it
is framed so as to receive him as if he were its hereditary lord。
But returning to the subject of our discourse； I say that whoever will
consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been
fatal to the above…named emperors； and it will be recognized also how it
happened that； a number of them acting in one way and a number in
another； only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to
unhappy ones。 Because it would have been useless and dangerous for
Pertinax and Alexander； being new princes； to imitate Marcus； who was
heir to the principality； and likewise it would have been utterly
destructive to Caracalla； modus； and Maximinus to have imitated
Severus； they not having sufficient valour to enable them to tread in
his footsteps。 Therefore a prince； new to the principality； cannot
imitate the actions of Marcus； nor； again； is it necessary to follow
those of Severus； but he ought to take from Severus those parts which
are necessary to found his state； and from Marcus those which are proper
and glorious to keep a state that may already be stable and firm。
CHAPTER XX
ARE FORTRESSES； AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT；
ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL？
1。 SOME princes； so as to hold securely the state； have disarmed their
subjects； others have kept their subject towns by factions； others have
fostered enmities against themselves； others have laid themselves out to
gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of their
governments； some have built fortresses； some have overthrown and
destroyed them。 And although one cannot give a final judgment on all one
of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in
which a decision has to be made； nevertheless I will speak as
prehensively as the matter of itself will admit。
2。 There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects； rather
when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them； because； by
arming them； those arms bee yours； those men who were distrusted
bee faithful； and those who were faithful are kept so； and your
subjects bee your adherents。 And whereas all subjects cannot be
armed； yet when those whom you do arm are benefited； the others can be
handled more freely； and this difference in their treatment； which they
quite understand； makes the former your dependants； and the latter；
considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
service should have the most reward； excuse you。 But when you disarm
them； you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them； either
for cowardice or for want of loyalty； and either of these opinions
breeds hatred against you。 And because you cannot remain unarmed； it
follows that you turn to mercenaries； which are of the character already
shown； even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to
defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects。 Therefore；
as I have said； a new prince in a new principality has always
distributed arms。 Histories are full of examples。 But when a prince
acquires a new state； which he adds as a province to his old one； then
it is necessary to disarm the men of that state； except those who have
been his adherents in acquiring it； and these again； with time and
opportunity； should be rendered soft and effeminate； and matters should
be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be
your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you。
3。 Our forefathers； and those who were reckoned wise； were accustomed to
say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
fortresses； and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily。 This
may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
balanced； but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for
to…day； because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use；
rather it is certain that when the enemy es upon you in divided
cities you are quickly lost； because the weakest party will always
assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist。 The
Venetians； moved； as I believe； by the above reasons； fostered the
Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities； and although
they never allowed them to e to bloodshed； yet they nursed these
disputes amongst them； so that the citizens； distracted by their
differences； should not unite against them。 Which； as we saw； did not
afterwards turn out as expected； because； after the rout at Vaila； one
party at once took courage and seized the state。 Such methods argue；
therefore； weakness in the prince； because these factions will never be
permitted in a vigorous principality； such methods for enabling one the
more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace； but if
war es this policy proves fallacious。
4。 Without doubt princes bee great when they overe the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted； and therefore
fortune； especially when she desires to make a new prince great； who has
a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one； causes
enemies to arise and form designs agai