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But no！ Mountains of volumes have been written by historians upon this campaign； and in all of them we find accounts of Napoleon’s masterly arrangements and deeply considered plans； of the strategy with which the soldiers were led； and the military genius showed by the marshals。
The retreat from Maley Yaroslavets； when nothing hindered Napoleon from passing through a country abundantly furnished with supplies； and the parallel road was open to him； along which Kutuzov afterwards pursued him—this wholly unnecessary return by a road through devastated country is explained to us as due to various sagacious considerations。 Similar reasons are given us for Napoleon’s retreat from Smolensk to Orsha。 Then we have a description of his heroism at Krasnoe； when he is reported to have prepared to give battle； and to take the command； and coming forward with a birch stick in his hand； to have said：
“Long enough I have been an emperor； it is time now to be a general！”
Yet in spite of this； he runs away immediately afterwards； abandoning the divided army in the rear to the hazards of destiny。
Then we have descriptions of the greatness of some of the marshals； especially of Ney—a greatness of soul that culminated in his taking a circuitous route by the forests across the Dnieper； and fleeing without his flags； his artillery； and nine…tenths of his men into Orsha。
And lastly； the final departure of the great Emperor from his heroic army is represented by the historians as something great—a stroke of genius。
Even that final act of running away—which in homely language would be described as the lowest depth of baseness； such as every child is taught to feel ashamed of—even that act finds justification in the language of the historians。
When it is impossible to stretch the elastic thread of historical argument further； when an action is plainly opposed to what all humanity is agreed in calling right and justice； the historians take refuge in the conception of greatness。 Greatness would appear to exclude all possibility of applying standards of right and wrong。 For the great man—nothing is wrong。 There is no atrocity which could be made a ground for blaming a great man。
“C’est grand！” cry the historians； and at that word good and bad have ceased to be； and there are only “grand” and not “grand。” “Grand” is equivalent to good； and not “grand” to bad。 To be grand is to their notions the characteristic of certain exceptional creatures； called by them heroes。 And Napoleon； wrapping himself in his warm fur cloak and hurrying home away from men； who were not only his comrades； but （in his belief） brought there by his doing； feels que c’est grand； and his soul is content。
“Du sublime au ridicule il n’y a qu’un pas；” he says （he sees something grand in himself）。 And the whole world has gone on for fifty years repeating： Sublime！ Grand！ Napoleon the Great。
“Du sublime au ridicule il n’y a qu’un pas。”
And it never enters any one’s head that to admit a greatness； immeasurable by the rule of right and wrong； is but to accept one’s own nothingness and immeasurable littleness。
For us； with the rule of right and wrong given us by Christ； there is nothing for which we have no standard。 And there is no greatness where there is not simplicity； goodness； and truth。
Chapter 19
WHAT RUSSIAN READER has not known an irksome feeling of annoyance； dissatisfaction； and perplexity； when he reads the accounts of the latter period of the campaign of 1812？ Who has not asked himself： How was it all the French were not captured or cut to pieces； when all the three Russian armies were surrounding them in superior numbers； when the French were a disorderly； starving； and freezing rabble； and the whole aim of the Russians （so history tells us） was to check； to cut off； and to capture all the French？
How was it that the Russian army； that with inferior numbers had fought the battle of Borodino； failed in its aim of capturing the French； when the latter were surrounded on three sides？ Can the French be so immensely superior to us that we are not equal to beating them； when we have surrounded them with forces numerically superior？ How could that have come to pass？ History （what passes by that name） answers these questions by saying that that came to pass because Kutuzov； and Tormasov； and Tchitchagov； and this general and that failed to carry out certain man？uvres。
But why did they fail to carry them out？ And how was it； if they really were responsible for not attaining the aim set before them； that they were not tried and punished for their shortcomings？ But even if we admit that Kutuzov and Tchitchagov and the others were responsible for the non…success of the Russians； it is still impossible to understand why； in the position the Russian troops were in at Krasnoe and the Berezina； on both occasions with numerically superior forces； the French army and marshals were not taken prisoners； if that really was the aim of the Russians。
The explanation of this phenomenon given by the Russian military historians—that Kutuzov hindered the attack—is insufficient； because we know that Kutuzov was not able to restrain the troops from attacking at Vyazma and Tarutino。 Why was it that the Russian army； that with inferior forces gained a victory at Borodino over the enemy in full strength； was unsuccessful at Krasnoe and the Berezina； when fighting in superior numbers against the undisciplined crowds of the French？
If the aim of the Russians really was to cut off Napoleon and his marshals； and to take them prisoners； and that aim was not only frustrated； but all attempts at attaining it were every time defeated in the most shameful way； this last period of the war is quite correctly represented by the French as a series of victories for them； and quite incorrectly represented by the Russians as redounding to our glory。
The Russian military historians； so far as they recognise the claims of logic； are forced to this conclusion； and in spite of their lyric eulogies of Russian gallantry and devotion； and all the rest of it； they are reluctantly obliged to admit that the retreat of the French from Moscow was a series of victories for Napoleon and of defeats for Kutuzov。
But putting patriotic vanity entirely aside； one cannot but feel that there is an inherent discrepancy in this conclusion； seeing that the series of French victories led to their complete annihilation； while the series of Russian defeats was followed by the destruction of their enemy； and the deliverance of their country。
The source of this discrepancy lies in the fact that historians； studying events in the light of the letters of the sovereigns and of generals； of narratives； reports； projects； and so on； have assumed quite falsely that the plan of that period of the campaign of 1812 was to cut off and capture Napoleon and his marshals and his army。
Such a plan never was； and could not have been； the aim of the Russian army； because it had no meaning； and its attainment was utterly out of the question。
There was no object in such a plan。 In the first place； because Napoleon’s army was flying in disorder at its utmost possible speed out of Russia； that is to say； doing the ver