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of the world… we must place it in a time at an infinite distance
from any given moment； for； otherwise； it must be dependent on some
other and higher existence。 Such an existence is； in this case； too
large for our empirical conception； and unattainable by the
continued regress of any synthesis。
But if we believe that everything in the world… be it condition or
conditioned… is contingent； every given existence is too small for our
conception。 For in this case we are pelled to seek for some other
existence upon which the former depends。
We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either
too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis； and
consequently for every possible conception of the understanding。 Why
did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this
and； instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or
of falling short of its true aim； possible experience； say that； in
the first case； the empirical conception is always too small for the
idea； and in the second too great； and thus attach the blame of
these contradictions to the empirical regress？ The reason is this。
Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions； without
it a conception is merely an idea； without truth or relation to an
object。 Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard
by which we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea
and fiction of thought； or whether it relates to an object in the
world。 If we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is
too large or too small； the former is considered as existing for the
sake of the latter； and requiring to be adapted to it。 Among the
trivial subjects of discussion in the old schools of dialectics was
this question： 〃If a ball cannot pass through a hole； shall we say
that the ball is too large or the hole too small？〃 In this case it
is indifferent what expression we employ； for we do not know which
exists for the sake of the other。 On the other hand； we cannot say：
〃The man is too long for his coat〃； but： 〃The coat is too short for
the man。〃
We are thus led to the well…founded suspicion that the
cosmological ideas； and all the conflicting sophistical assertions
connected with them； are based upon a false and fictitious
conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is presented
to us； and this suspicion will probably direct us how to expose the
illusion that has so long led us astray from the truth。
SECTION VI。 Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the
Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic。
In the transcendental aesthetic we proved that everything intuited
in space and time； all objects of a possible experience； are nothing
but phenomena； that is； mere representations； and that these； as
presented to us… as extended bodies； or as series of changes… have
no self…subsistent existence apart from human thought。 This doctrine I
call Transcendental Idealism。* The realist in the transcendental sense
regards these modifications of our sensibility； these mere
representations； as things subsisting in themselves。
*I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism； to distinguish
it from material idealism； which doubts or denies the existence of
external things。 To avoid ambiguity； it seems advisable in many
cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the text。
It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long…decried theory
of empirical idealism； which； while admitting the reality of space；
denies； or at least doubts； the existence of bodies extended in it；
and thus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and
illusion。 The supporters of this theory find no difficulty in
admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in
time； nay； they go the length of maintaining that this internal
experience is of itself a sufficient proof of the real existence of
its object as a thing in itself。
Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external
intuition… as intuited in space； and all changes in time… as
represented by the internal sense； are real。 For； as space is the form
of that intuition which we call external； and； without objects in
space； no empirical representation could be given us； we can and ought
to regard extended bodies in it as real。 The case is the same with
representations in time。 But time and space； with all phenomena
therein； are not in themselves things。 They are nothing but
representations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind。
Nay； the sensuous internal intuition of the mind （as the object of
consciousness）； the determination of which is represented by the
succession of different states in time； is not the real； proper
self； as it exists in itself… not the transcendental subject… but only
a phenomenon； which is presented to the sensibility of this； to us；
unknown being。 This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a
self…subsisting thing； for its condition is time； and time cannot be
the condition of a thing in itself。 But the empirical truth of
phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of
doubt； and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or
fancy… although both have a proper and thorough connection in an
experience according to empirical laws。 The objects of experience then
are not things in themselves； but are given only in experience； and
have no existence apart from and independently of experience。 That
there may be inhabitants in the moon； although no one has ever
observed them； must certainly be admitted； but this assertion means
only； that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them
at some future time。 For that which stands in connection with a
perception according to the laws of the progress of experience is
real。 They are therefore really existent； if they stand in empirical
connection with my actual or real consciousness； although they are not
in themselves real； that is； apart from the progress of experience。
There is nothing actually given… we can be conscious of nothing as
real； except a perception and the empirical progression from it to
other possible perceptions。 For phenomena； as mere representations；
are real only in perception； and perception is； in fact； nothing but
the reality of an empirical representation； that is； a phenomenon。
To call a phenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either
that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of
experience； or it means nothing at all。 For I can say only of a
thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and
experience。 But we are speaking here merely of phenomena in space
and time； both of which are determinations of sensibility； and not
of things in themselves。 It follows that phenomena are not things in
themselves； but are mere representations； which if not given in us… in
perception… are non…existent。
The faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity… a
capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representations； the
relation of which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time…
the pure forms