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one or no。 Arrived at this point； all sorts of excuses are sought
after； in order to console us for its want of stability； or rather；
indeed； to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous
an investigation。 But what frees us during the process of building
from all apprehension or suspicion； and flatters us into the belief of
its solidity； is this。 A great part； perhaps the greatest part； of the
business of our reason consists in the analysation of the
conceptions which we already possess of objects。 By this means we gain
a multitude of cognitions； which although really nothing more than
elucidations or explanations of that which （though in a confused
manner） was already thought in our conceptions； are； at least in
respect of their form； prized as new introspections； whilst； so far as
regards their matter or content； we have really made no addition to
our conceptions； but only disinvolved them。 But as this process does
furnish a real priori knowledge； which has a sure progress and
useful results； reason； deceived by this； slips in； without being
itself aware of it； assertions of a quite different kind； in which； to
given conceptions it adds others； a priori indeed； but entirely
foreign to them； without our knowing how it arrives at these； and；
indeed； without such a question ever suggesting itself。 I shall
therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these
two modes of knowledge。
IV。 Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements。
In all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate
is cogitated （I mention affirmative judgements only here； the
application to negative will be very easy）； this relation is
possible in two different ways。 Either the predicate B belongs to
the subject A； as somewhat which is contained （though covertly） in the
conception A； or the predicate B lies pletely out of the conception
A； although it stands in connection with it。 In the first instance；
I term the judgement analytical； in the second； synthetical。
Analytical judgements （affirmative） are therefore those in which the
connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through
identity； those in which this connection is cogitated without
identity； are called synthetical judgements。 The former may be
called explicative； the latter augmentative judgements； because the
former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the
subject； but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions； which
were thought already in the subject； although in a confused manner；
the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was
not contained in it； and which no analysis could ever have
discovered therein。 For example； when I say； 〃All bodies are
extended；〃 this is an analytical judgement。 For I need not go beyond
the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it；
but merely analyse the conception； that is； bee conscious of the
manifold properties which I think in that conception； in order to
discover this predicate in it： it is therefore an analytical
judgement。 On the other hand； when I say； 〃All bodies are heavy；〃
the predicate is something totally different from that which I think
in the mere conception of a body。 By the addition of such a predicate；
therefore； it bees a synthetical judgement。
Judgements of experience； as such； are always synthetical。 For it
would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on
experience； because in forming such a judgement I need not go out of
the sphere of my conceptions； and therefore recourse to the
testimony of experience is quite unnecessary。 That 〃bodies are
extended〃 is not an empirical judgement； but a proposition which
stands firm a priori。 For before addressing myself to experience； I
already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the
judgement； and I have only to extract the predicate from the
conception； according to the principle of contradiction； and thereby
at the same time bee conscious of the necessity of the judgement； a
necessity which I could never learn from experience。 On the other
hand； though at first I do not at all include the predicate of
weight in my conception of body in general； that conception still
indicates an object of experience； a part of the totality of
experience； to which I can still add other parts； and this I do when I
recognize by observation that bodies are heavy。 I can cognize
beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the
characteristics of extension； impenetrability； shape； etc。； all
which are cogitated in this conception。 But now I extend my knowledge；
and looking back on experience from which I had derived this
conception of body； I find weight at all times connected with the
above characteristics； and therefore I synthetically add to my
conceptions this as a predicate； and say； 〃All bodies are heavy。〃 Thus
it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis
of the predicate of weight with the conception of body； because both
conceptions； although the one is not contained in the other； still
belong to one another （only contingently； however）； as parts of a
whole； namely； of experience； which is itself a synthesis of
intuitions。
But to synthetical judgements a priori； such aid is entirely
wanting。 If I go out of and beyond the conception A； in order to
recognize another B as connected with it； what foundation have I to
rest on； whereby to render the synthesis possible？ I have here no
longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for
what I want。 Let us take； for example； the proposition； 〃Everything
that happens has a cause。〃 In the conception of 〃something that
happens；〃 I indeed think an existence which a certain time
antecedes； and from this I can derive analytical judgements。 But the
conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception； and
indicates something entirely different from 〃that which happens；〃
and is consequently not contained in that conception。 How then am I
able to assert concerning the general conception… 〃that which
happens〃… something entirely different from that conception； and to
recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it； yet as
belonging to it； and even necessarily？ what is here the unknown = X；
upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found；
out of the conception A a foreign predicate B； which it nevertheless
considers to be connected with it？ It cannot be experience； because
the principle adduced annexes the two representations； cause and
effect； to the representation existence； not only with universality；
which experience cannot give； but also with the expression of
necessity； therefore pletely a priori and from pure conceptions。
Upon such synthetical； that is augmentative propositions； depends
the whole aim of our speculative knowledge a priori； for although
analytical judgements are indeed highly important and necessary；
they are so； only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which
is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis； and this alone is a
real acquisition。
V。 In all Theoretical Sciences of Reaso