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which constitute our conception of human nature； to a plete
attainment of their final aims； but also everything which is requisite
for the plete determination of the idea； for of all contradictory
predicates； only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man。
What I have termed an ideal was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the
divine mind… an individual object present to its pure intuition； the
most perfect of every kind of possible beings； and the archetype of
all phenomenal existences。
Without rising to these speculative heights； we are bound to confess
that human reason contains not only ideas； but ideals； which
possess； not； like those of Plato； creative； but certainly practical
power… as regulative principles； and form the basis of the
perfectibility of certain actions。 Moral conceptions are not perfectly
pure conceptions of reason； because an empirical element… of
pleasure or pain… lies at the foundation of them。 In relation；
however； to the principle； whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom
which is in itself without law； and consequently when we attend merely
to their form； they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason。
Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity are ideas。 But the wise
man of the Stoics is an ideal； that is to say； a human being
existing only in thought and in plete conformity with the idea of
wisdom。 As the idea provides a rule； so the ideal serves as an
archetype for the perfect and plete determination of the copy。 Thus
the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of
action； with which we may pare and judge ourselves； which may
help us to reform ourselves； although the perfection it demands can
never be attained by us。 Although we cannot concede objective
reality to these ideals； they are not to be considered as chimeras； on
the contrary； they provide reason with a standard； which enables it to
estimate； by parison； the degree of inpleteness in the objects
presented to it。 But to aim at realizing the ideal in an example in
the world of experience… to describe； for instance； the character of
the perfectly wise man in a romance… is impracticable。 Nay more； there
is something absurd in the attempt； and the result must be little
edifying； as the natural limitations； which are continually breaking
in upon the perfection and pleteness of the idea； destroy the
illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is
good in the idea； which hence appears fictitious and unreal。
Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason； which is always
based upon determinate conceptions； and serves as a rule and a model
for limitation or of criticism。 Very different is the nature of the
ideals of the imagination。 Of these it is impossible to present an
intelligible conception； they are a kind of monogram； drawn
according to no determinate rule； and forming rather a vague
picture… the production of many diverse experiences… than a
determinate image。 Such are the ideals which painters and
physiognomists profess to have in their minds； and which can serve
neither as a model for production nor as a standard for
appreciation。 They may be termed； though improperly； sensuous
ideals； as they are declared to be models of certain possible
empirical intuitions。 They cannot； however； furnish rules or standards
for explanation or examination with
In its ideals； reason aims at plete and perfect determination
according to a priori rules； and hence it cogitates an object； which
must be pletely determinable in conformity with principles；
although all empirical conditions are absent； and the conception of
the object is on this account transcendent。
SECTION II。 Of the Transcendental Ideal （Prototypon
Trancendentale）。
Every conception is； in relation to that which is not contained in
it； undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability。 This
principle is that； of every two contradictorily opposed predicates；
only one can belong to a conception。 It is a purely logical principle；
itself based upon the principle of contradiction； inasmuch as it makes
plete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the
logical form of the cognition。
But again； everything； as regards its possibility； is also subject
to the principle of plete determination； according to which one
of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong
to it。 This principle is not based merely upon that of
contradiction； for； in addition to the relation between two
contradictory predicates； it regards everything as standing in a
relation to the sum of possibilities； as the sum total of all
predicates of things； and； while presupposing this sum as an a
priori condition； presents to the mind everything as receiving the
possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears to；
and the share it possesses in； the aforesaid sum of possibilities。*
The principle of plete determination relates the content and not to
the logical form。 It is the principle of the synthesis of all the
predicates which are required to constitute the plete conception of
a thing； and not a mere principle analytical representation； which
enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a
conception。 It contains； moreover； a transcendental presupposition…
that； namely； of the material for all possibility； which must
contain a priori the data for this or that particular possibility。
*Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to
a mon correlate… the sum…total of possibility； which； if discovered
to exist in the idea of one individual thing； would establish the
affinity of all possible things； from the identity of the ground of
their plete determination。 The determinability of every
conception is subordinate to the universality （Allgemeinheit；
universalitas） of the principle of excluded middle； the
determination of a thing to the totality （Allheit； universitas） of all
possible predicates。
The proposition； Everything which exists is pletely determined；
means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory
attributes； but that one of all possible attributes； is always
predicable of the thing； in it the predicates are not merely
pared logically with each other； but the thing itself is
transcendentally pared with the sum…total of all possible
predicates。 The proposition is equivalent to saying： 〃To attain to a
plete knowledge of a thing； it is necessary to possess a
knowledge of everything that is possible； and to determine it
thereby in a positive or negative manner。〃 The conception of
plete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be
presented in its totality in concreto； and is therefore based upon
an idea； which has its seat in the reason… the faculty which
prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect
exercise relates
Now； although this idea of the sum…total of all possibility； in so
far as it forms the condition of the plete determination of
everything； is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which
may constitute this sum…total； and we cogitate in it merely the
sum…total of all p