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contained in my conception； but forms a synthetical addition to my
conception （which is merely a determination of my mental state）；
although this objective reality… this existence… apart from my
conceptions； does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid
hundred dollars。
By whatever and by whatever number of predicates… even to the
plete determination of it… I may cogitate a thing； I do not in
the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the
statement： This thing exists。 Otherwise； not exactly the same； but
something more than what was cogitated in my conception； would
exist； and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception
had real existence。 If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of
reality except one； the mode of reality which is absent is not added
to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing
exists； on the contrary； the thing exists… if it exist at all… with
the same defect as that cogitated in its conception； otherwise not
that which was cogitated； but something different； exists。 Now； if I
cogitate a being as the highest reality； without defect or
imperfection； the question still remains… whether this being exists or
not？ For； although no element is wanting in the possible real
content of my conception； there is a defect in its relation to my
mental state； that is； I am ignorant whether the cognition of the
object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori。 And
here the cause of the present difficulty bees apparent。 If the
question regarded an object of sense merely； it would be impossible
for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing。 For
the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according
with the general conditions of experience； while the existence of
the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the sphere of
actual experience。 At the same time； this connection with the world of
experience does not in the least augment the conception； although a
possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind。
But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone； it is not
to be wondered at； that we should find ourselves unable to present any
criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility。
Whatever be the content of our conception of an object； it is
necessary to go beyond it； if we wish to predicate existence of the
object。 In the case of sensuous objects； this is attained by their
connection according to empirical laws with some one of my
perceptions； but there is no means of cognizing the existence of
objects of pure thought； because it must be cognized pletely a
priori。 But all our knowledge of existence （be it immediately by
perception； or by inferences connecting some object with a perception）
belongs entirely to the sphere of experience… which is in perfect
unity with itself； and although an existence out of this sphere cannot
be absolutely declared to be impossible； it is a hypothesis the
truth of which we have no means of ascertaining。
The notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful
idea； but for the very reason that it is an idea； it is incapable of
enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things。 It
is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being
which we do not know to exist。 The analytical criterion of
possibility； which consists in the absence of contradiction in
propositions； cannot be denied it。 But the connection of real
properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an
a priori judgement cannot be formed； because these realities are not
presented to us specifically； and even if this were to happen； a
judgement would still be impossible； because the criterion of the
possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the
world of experience； to which the object of an idea cannot belong。 And
thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to
establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime
ideal being。
The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence
of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient； and we may as well
hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas； as
the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his
cash account。
SECTION V。 Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof
of the Existence of God。
It was by no means a natural course of proceeding； but； on the
contrary； an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools； to
attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object
corresponding to it。 Such a course would never have been pursued； were
it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress；
and that； as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori； reason
is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy； if possible；
this requirement； and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of
such a being。 This conception was thought to be found in the idea of
an ens realissimum； and thus this idea was employed for the attainment
of a better defined knowledge of a necessary being； of the existence
of which we were convinced； or persuaded； on other grounds。 Thus
reason was seduced from her natural courage； and； instead of
concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum； an attempt was
made to begin with it； for the purpose of inferring from it that
idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to
plete。 Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument； which
neither satisfies the healthy mon sense of humanity； nor sustains
the scientific examination of the philosopher。
The cosmological proof； which we are about to examine； retains the
connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality； but；
instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary
existence； like the preceding argument； it concludes from the given。
unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality。 The track
it pursues； whether rational or sophistical； is at least natural；
and not only goes far to persuade the mon understanding； but
shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect；
while it contains； at the same time； the outlines of all the arguments
employed in natural theology… arguments which always have been； and
still will be； in use and authority。 These； however adorned； and hid
under whatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment； are at bottom
identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss。 This proof；
termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi； I shall now
lay before the reader； and subject to a strict examination。
It is framed in the following manner： If something exists； an
absolutely necessary being must likewise exist。 Now I； at least；
exist。 Consequently； there exists an absolutely necessary being。 The
minor contains an experience； the major reasons from a general
experience to the existence of a necessary being。* Thus this
argument really begins at experience； and is not pl