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perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which； and
the extent to which； the understanding ought to carry the systematic
connection of its conceptions。 But； although it is impossible to
discover in intuition a schema for the plete systematic unity of
all the conceptions of the understanding； there must be some
analogon of this schema。 This analogon is the idea of the maximum of
the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle。 For
we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely
perfect； all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an
indeterminate and various content having been abstracted。 Thus the
idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema； with this
difference； that the application of the categories to the schema of
reason does not present a cognition of any object （as is the case with
the application of the categories to sensuous schemata）； but merely
provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the
exercise of the understanding。 Now； as every principle which imposes
upon the exercise of the understanding a priori pliance with the
rule of systematic unity also relates； although only in an indirect
manner； to an object of experience； the principles of pure reason will
also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience。
But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any
empirical object； they will merely indicate the procedure； following
which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding
may be in plete harmony and connection with itself… a result
which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle
of systematic unity； so far as that is possible； and deduced from it。
I term all subjective principles； which are not derived from
observation of the constitution of an object； but from the interest
which Reason has in producing a certain pleteness in her
cognition of that object； maxims of reason。 Thus there are maxims of
speculative reason； which are based solely upon its speculative
interest； although they appear to be objective principles。
When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
constitutive； and employed as objective principles； contradictions
must arise； but if they are considered as mere maxims； there is no
room for contradictions of any kind； as they then merely indicate
the different interests of reason； which occasion differences in the
mode of thought。 In effect； Reason has only one single interest； and
the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates
a difference in； and a reciprocal limitation of； the methods by
which this interest is satisfied。
This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity… in
accordance with the principle of specification； another； the
interest of unity… in accordance with the principle of aggregation。
Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into
the subject he is examining； and yet it has been influenced solely
by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two
principles； neither of which are objective； but originate solely
from the interest of reason； and on this account to be termed maxims
rather than principles。 When I observe intelligent men disputing about
the distinctive characteristics of men； animals； or plants； and even
of minerals； those on the one side assuming the existence of certain
national characteristics； certain well…defined and hereditary
distinctions of family； race； and so on； while the other side maintain
that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and
dispositions； and that all differences are but the result of
external and accidental circumstances… I have only to consider for a
moment the real nature of the subject of discussion； to arrive at
the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of；
and that there is little probability of either party being able to
speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of
the subject itself。 Both have； in reality； been struggling for the
twofold interest of reason； the one maintaining the one interest；
the other the other。 But this difference between the maxims of
diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted； although；
so long as they are regarded as objective principles； they must
occasion not only contradictions and polemic； but place hinderances in
the way of the advancement of truth； until some means is discovered of
reconciling these conflicting interests； and bringing reason into
union and harmony with itself。
The same is the case with the so…called law discovered by
Leibnitz； and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet… the law
of the continuous gradation of created beings； which is nothing more
than an inference from the principle of affinity； for observation
and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as
an objective truth。 The steps of this ladder； as they appear in
experience； are too far apart from each other； and the so…called petty
differences between different kinds of animals are in nature
monly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in
such views （particularly when we reflect on the great variety of
things； and the ease with which we can discover resemblances）； and
no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes
of nature。 On the other hand； the method of investigating the order of
nature in the light of this principle； and the maxim which requires us
to regard this order… it being still undetermined how far it
extends… as really existing in nature； is beyond doubt a legitimate
and excellent principle of reason… a principle which extends farther
than any experience or observation of ours and which； without giving
us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience；
guides us to the goal of systematic unity。
Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason。
The ideas of pure reason cannot be； of themselves and in their own
nature； dialectical； it is from their misemployment alone that
fallacies and illusions arise。 For they originate in the nature of
reason itself； and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all
the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of
confidence and promotive of error。 It is to be expected； therefore；
that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim。 It is true； the
mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and
contradiction； and affect to despise the government of that faculty；
because they cannot understand its constitution； while it is to its
beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the
intelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its
procedure。
We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty； until we
have made a transcendental deduction therefore。 The ideas of pure
reason do not admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories。
But if they are to possess the least objective validity； and to
represent anything but mere creations of thought （entia rationis
ratiocinantis）； a deduction of the