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but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect
freedom which ought to be its essential condition。 In this case； we
should have had at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism；
which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes； by exposing
the illusions and prejudices in which they originated。
There is in human nature an unworthy propensity… a propensity which；
like everything that springs from nature； must in its final purpose be
conducive to the good of humanity… to conceal our real sentiments； and
to give expression only to certain received opinions； which are
regarded as at once safe and promotive of the mon good。 It is true；
this tendency； not only to conceal our real sentiments； but to profess
those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society； has not only
civilized； but； in a certain measure； moralized us； as no one can
break through the outward covering of respectability； honour； and
morality； and thus the seemingly…good examples which we which we see
around us form an excellent school for moral improvement； so long as
our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken。 But this disposition
to represent ourselves as better than we are； and to utter opinions
which are not our own； can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary
arrangement of nature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized
state； and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and
manner of the good we see。 But when true principles have been
developed； and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of
thought； this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour；
otherwise it corrupts the heart； and checks the growth of good
dispositions with the mischievous weed of air appearances。
I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and
hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion； where there is less
temptation to restrain the free expression of thought。 For what can be
more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify
our real sentiments； to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard
to our statements； or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof
which we well know to be insufficient？ So long as mere personal vanity
is the source of these unworthy artifices… and this is generally the
case in speculative discussions； which are mostly destitute of
practical interest； and are incapable of plete demonstration… the
vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side；
and thus the result is the same； although it is not brought about so
soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright
spirit。 But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of
certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very
foundations of public welfare and morality… it seems not only prudent；
but even praise worthy； to maintain the good cause by illusory
arguments； rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage
of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely
practical conviction； and of pelling us to confess our inability to
attain to apodeictic certainty in speculative subjects。 But we ought
to reflect that there is nothing； in the world more fatal to the
maintenance of a good cause than deceit； misrepresentation； and
falsehood。 That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in
the discussion of a purely speculative subject is the least
requirement that can be made。 If we could reckon with security even
upon so little； the conflict of speculative reason regarding the
important questions of God； immortality； and freedom； would have
been either decided long ago； or would very soon be brought to a
conclusion。 But； in general； the uprightness of the defence stands
in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause； and perhaps more
honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who
uphold these doctrines。
I shall persuade myself； then； that I have readers who do not wish
to see a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments。 Such will now
recognize the fact that； according to the principles of this Critique；
if we consider not what is； but what ought to be the case； there can
be really no polemic of pure reason。 For how can two persons dispute
about a thing； the reality of which neither can present in actual or
even in possible experience？ Each adopts the plan of meditating on his
idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea； if he can； what is more
than the idea； that is； the reality of the object which it
indicates。 How shall they settle the dispute； since neither is able to
make his assertions directly prehensible and certain； but must
restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent？ All
statements enounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of
possible experience； beyond the sphere of which we can discover no
criterion of truth； while they are at the same time framed in
accordance with the laws of the understanding； which are applicable
only to experience； and thus it is the fate of all such speculative
discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his
opponent； he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses。
The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest
tribunal for all speculative disputes； for it is not involved in these
disputes； which have an immediate relation to certain objects and
not to the laws of the mind； but is instituted for the purpose of
determining the rights and limits of reason。
Without the control of criticism； reason is； as it were； in a
state of nature； and can only establish its claims and assertions by
war。 Criticism； on the contrary； deciding all questions according to
the fundamental laws of its own institution； secures to us the peace
of law and order； and enables us to discuss all differences in the
more tranquil manner of a legal process。 In the former case；
disputes are ended by victory； which both sides may claim and which is
followed by a hollow armistice； in the latter； by a sentence； which；
as it strikes at the root of all speculative differences； ensures to
all concerned a lasting peace。 The endless disputes of a dogmatizing
reason pel us to look for some mode of arriving at a settled
decision by a critical investigation of reason itself； just as
Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice
and violence； and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the
constraint of law； which indeed limits individual freedom； but only
that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the mon
good of all。
This freedom will； among other things； permit of our openly
stating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to
solve； without being decried on that account as turbulent and
dangerous citizens。 This privilege forms part of the native rights
of human reason； which recognizes no other judge than the universal
reason of humanity； and as this reason is the source of all progress
and improvement； such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable。
It is unwise； moreover； to denounce as dangerous any bold assertions
against； or rash attacks upon； an opinion which is held by