按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
refer。 Other arguments in support of this principle have been
attempted… such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon；
but when this argument is considered； we can discover no criterion
of contingency； except the fact of an event… of something happening；
that is to say； the existence which is preceded by the non…existence
of an object； and thus we fall back on the very thing to be proved。 If
the proposition： 〃Every thinking being is simple；〃 is to be proved； we
keep to the conception of the ego； which is simple； and to which all
thought has a relation。 The same is the case with the transcendental
proof of the existence of a Deity； which is based solely upon the
harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens
realissimum and a necessary being； and cannot be attempted in any
other manner。
This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all
propositions of reason。 When reason employs conceptions alone； only
one proof of its thesis is possible； if any。 When； therefore； the
dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition； we
may be sure that not one of them is conclusive。 For if he possessed
one which proved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration…
as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason…
what need is there for any more？ His intention can only be similar
to that of the advocate who had different arguments for different
judges； this availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his
arguments； who； without going into any profound investigation； adopt
the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight and
decide according to it。
The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a
proof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or
indirect； but always ostensive or direct。 The direct or ostensive
proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be
proved； but exposes the grounds of its truth； the apagogic； on the
other hand； may assure us of the truth of the proposition； but it
cannot enable us to prehend the grounds of its possibility。 The
latter is； accordingly； rather an auxiliary to an argument； than a
strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure。 In one respect；
however； they have an advantage over direct proofs； from the fact that
the mode of arguing by contradiction； which they employ； renders our
understanding of the question more clear； and approximates the proof
to the certainty of an intuitional demonstration。
The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different
sciences is this。 When the grounds upon which we seek to base a
cognition are too various or too profound； we try whether or not we
may not discover the truth of our cognition from its consequences。 The
modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its inferences to the
truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the inferences
that can be drawn from it are known to be true； for in this case there
can be only one possible ground for these inferences； and that is
the true one。 But this is a quite impracticable procedure； as it
surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences
that can be drawn from a proposition。 But this mode of reasoning is
employed； under favour； when we wish to prove the truth of an
hypothesis； in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion…
which is supported by analogy… that； if all the inferences we have
drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed； all other
possible inferences will also agree with it。 But； in this way； an
hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth。 The modus
tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition；
is not only a rigorous； but a very easy mode of proof。 For； if it
can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false；
then the proposition must itself be false。 Instead； then； of
examining； in an ostensive argument； the whole series of the grounds
on which the truth of a proposition rests； we need only take the
opposite of this proposition； and if one inference from it be false；
then must the opposite be itself false； and； consequently； the
proposition which we wished to prove must be true。
The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences
where it is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an
objective cognition。 Where this is possible； it is plain that the
opposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective
conditions of thought； and not the objective cognition； or it may
happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a
subjective condition； which is incorrectly considered to be objective；
and； as the condition is itself false； both propositions may be false；
and it will； consequently； be impossible to conclude the truth of
the one from the falseness of the other。
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible； and it is in this
science； accordingly； that the indirect mode of proof has its true
place。 In the science of nature； where all assertion is based upon
empirical intuition； such subreptions may be guarded against by the
repeated parison of observations； but this mode of proof is of
little value in this sphere of knowledge。 But the transcendental
efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective；
which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion； and thus
reason endeavours； in its premisses； to impose upon us subjective
representations for objective cognitions。 In the transcendental sphere
of pure reason； then； and in the case of synthetical propositions；
it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the
counter…statement。 For only two cases are possible； either； the
counter…statement is nothing but the enouncement of the
inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions
of reason； which does not affect the real case （for example； we cannot
prehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being；
and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being
must be opposed on subjective grounds； while the possibility of this
being in itself cannot with justice be denied）； or； both propositions；
being dialectical in their nature； are based upon an impossible
conception。 In this latter case the rule applies： non entis nulla sunt
predicata； that is to say； what we affirm and what we deny； respecting
such an object； are equally untrue； and the apagogic mode of
arriving at the truth is in this case impossible。 If； for example；
we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its
totality； it is false； either that it is infinite； or that it is
finite and limited in space。 Both are false； because the hypothesis is
false。 For the notion of phenomena （as mere representations） which are
given in themselves （as objects） is self…contradictory； and the
infinitude of this imaginary whole would； indeed； be unconditioned；
but would be inconsistent （as everything in the phenomenal world is
conditioned） with the unconditioned determination and finitude of
quantities which is presupposed in our conception。
The apagogic mode of proof is the true